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SEXUAL DISTINCTIONS IN PENSIONS.
By PETER BARTLETT*
I. OVERVIEW AND INTRODUCTION
The nature and extent of direct and constructive discrimination in
the fields of private pensions, life insurance, and annuities2 discrimination
can only be understood in the broader context of estate planning and
income support for senior citizens. Canada has a three-tiered retirement
© Copyright, 1986, Peter Bartlett.
* M.A., LLB, Author of Mental Health Law: The Advocates' Manual (Toronto: CLE, 1986)
Bill 170: A Post-Script - As this paper was in the final stages of editing prior to publication,
a new Pension Benefits Act, Bill 170, became law in Ontario (Province of Ontario, 33rd Legislature,
3rd Session, Bill 170). The new legislation changes the existing law discussed in this paper in
three respects.
Firstly, pensions now vest after a maximum of two years of employment (section 38). For
the reasons discussed in this paper, this may be expected to be a key improvement for women
in the long term.
Secondly, survivors' pensions are required to be at least sixty per cent of the base pension
(section 45 (3)). For women, who are normally the survivors, this is also an important advance,
although it remains questionable whether sixty per cent is high enough.
Finally, there is to be no discrimination on the basis of gender in setting either premiums
paid by the plan member or the benefits paid out under the plan (section 53). Ontario is the first
province to take this step. The Act does not render the gender-based tables completely obsolete,
however, since the employer may be required to contribute different amounts depending on the
sex of the employee (section 53(2)(b)).
These amendments render obsolete much of the tactical discussion of legal challenges in this
paper, regarding Ontario pension plans. The Act does not cover privately purchased annuities, however,
and the discussion above continues to be relevant in assessing those plans. Further, the pension
legislation in other Canadian provinces is analogous to the former Ontario legislation, and it is
hoped that the discussion contained in this paper may be of interest regarding those provinces.
In the long term, the Ontario Act can be expected to improve the pension structure for women.
The transitional provisions delay the benefits of the new legislation, however. The revised vesting
period applies only to the pension plan of which an individual is a member on or after the Act
comes into force (section 38(2)(a)). The increased survivor pensions do not affect pensions now
being received (section 45(4)(a)), and the prohibition of gender-based contributions and benefits
applies only for contributions and benefits resulting from employment after December 31, 1986
(section 53(3)(b)).
Thus, a full generation of workers will pass before the benefits of this new Act are completely
realized. For roughly the next forty years, therefore, elderly women will remain poor. The Act
must not be perceived as a substitute for increased social assistance in this transitional period.
2 Under the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 218, s. 1 (35), 'life insurance' is a generic term
for insurance policies where money is paid (a) on death, (b) on an event dependent on human
life, (c) at a fixed or determinable future time, or (d) for a term dependent on human life. Pensions
and annuities are thus a species of life insurance. It will be important to distinguish within this
class. The term 'life insurance' will therefore be restricted to mean insurance policies where money
is payable upon the death of the policyholder.
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system. At the basic level is Old Age Security (OAS) and the Guaranteed
Income Supplement (GIS). The OAS is payable to all Canadian citizens
over the age of sixty-five. The pension stood at $251 per month in 19833
and is indexed to the cost of living. The GIS is available to persons receiving
the OAS whose income is below a certain level, roughly $9,000 for singles
and $15,000 for couples per annum including the OAS. In 1983, the
GIS stood at a maximum $252 per month for singles and $194 each
for spouses.4 Once again, the GIS is indexed to the cost of living. These
are the only universal retirement income programmes in Canada.
The Canada Pension Plan and the Quebec Pension Plan (C/QPP)
make up the second tier. These plans provide a retirement pension at
age sixty-five equal to one quarter of average lifetime annual earnings,
up to a maximum. In 1983, the maximum monthly C/QPP pension was
$345.5 These pensions are also indexed to the cost of living and vest
immediately. Survivor benefits are available to spouses to a maximum
60 percent of the deceased's C/QPP pension. Because the plans do not
use gender-based actuarial tables and because they vest immediately,
implicit and explicit gender distinctions are minimal.6
The third tier of the system consists of private pension plans, registered
retirement savings plans (RRSPs), annuities, and other savings. Pension
plans are usually terms of specific employment contracts. Presently, only
30.6 percent of the women and 44.8 percent of the men in the Canadian
workforce are covered by these plans.7 This figure is, in fact, misleadingly
3 National Action Committee on the Status of Women, "Pension Reform" (Toronto: NAC,
1983) at 3.
4 Ibid. at 4.
5 Ibid.
6 The National Action Committee on the Status of Women has pointed out that women remaining
at home to raise children are likely to receive lower CPP benefits. In these years, their income
is likely to be negligible. This lowers the average annual earnings of these women, reducing their
CPP entitlement: see NAC, "Women and Pensions" (Toronto: NAC, 1982). This is remedied in
the QPP by a "child-care drop-out" provision, whereby time spent at home with young children
is excluded from calculation of lifetime average earnings. A similar issue exists in private pensions,
where women raising children have smaller lifetime contributions to a money-purchase plan and
smaller amounts of service under defined benefit plans, thereby entitling them to smaller pensions
upon retirement.
The drop-out provisions are justified under the QPP as a matter of social policy. The issue
is how widely the financial burden of raising children ought to be spread. There is a strong social
argument that women should not suffer in their old age because they raised children at home.
It is not a problem with which private insurance and pension plans can deal, however. The principles
of insurance law applicable to private pensions are based on expected returns to specific contributions.
Movements away from this principle may be justified in some cases, but the drop-out provision
would be a large departure from the standard practice. In addition, the advantage to women would
be limited, as it may be likely that they will return to the same pension plan when they return
to the workforce.
7 Statistics Canada, Pension Plans in Canada, 1982, (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services,
1984) at 13. Participation in Ontario is roughly 1.7 percent higher than the national average overall
(ibid. at 18). No sexual breakdown is available for the Ontario figures.
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high since vesting provisions reduce the actual number of persons who
will receive any benefit from their plans. Because of employment patterns,
a disproportionately low number of pensions held by women vest.8 Private
pensions are normally not indexed to inflation.9 Persons who are not
covered by pension plans may buy annuities, or they may live off their
savings.
In this regard, the RRSP warrants special attention. This is a tax
deferral scheme designed to encourage saving for retirement. Normally
upon retirement, these savings will be rolled over into an annuity, again
mainly for tax reasons. Individuals not involved in private pension plans
may contribute 20 percent of their earned income to this scheme to
a maximum $5,500 per annum. For participants in pension plans, the
maximum is $3,500, less the amount of any employee contributions to
that pension plan.,o Contributions are made disproportionately by high
income earners.",
The importance of pensions and annuities in providing retirement
income is clear. The maximum combination of OAS, GIS, and maximum
C/QPP for a single person yields a total monthly income of $675, which
is already roughly 10 percent below the poverty line for persons living
alone in cities. 2 Persons living at or above the poverty line, therefore,
are doing so on the basis of the third tier of the pension system.
For women, this presents particular problems. Because they may
have spent their lives working primarily in the home, and because vesting
provisions may also tend to work to their disadvantage, elderly women
typically do not have a pension of their own. They may have survivor
rights on their spouse's pension, but that is likely to give them only
one-half of the spouse's former pension. The problem of private
8 See section 3, infra.
9 In all, 68.9 percent of employees covered by pension plans were in plans which had no
indexation. A further 10.9 percent were in plans with only partial indexation. Plans with total
indexation were almost exclusively in the public sector- Statistics Canada, Pensions, supra, note
6 at 48.
10 Income Tax Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63, s. 146(5).
11 This is partly because RRSPs are essentially tax deferral schemes, and persons in higher
tax brackets have a greater incentive to participate. On the other hand, it is also a savings plan,
and the relatively poor have less money available to save.
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pensions normally not being indexed to inflation is more important for
women who tend to live longer than men.
Five factors work to the disadvantage of women in the field of
pensions and annuities: base salaries, gender-based mortality tables,
survivor benefits, vesting provisions, and the general lack of indexation
of benefits.
Working men earn, on average, more than one and one-half times
as much as working women.,3 This means that pensions for women are
correspondingly smaller. Similarly, women cannot afford to buy as large
annuities on the private market as they have less disposable income than
men. The problems of income disparity are beyond the scope of this
paper, but they are very important in understanding the limitations of
pensions for women.
Gender-based mortality tables are used to calculate premium rates
or benefit rates for some pensions and almost all life insurance and annuity
contracts. These tables increase premiums for women for similar monthly
pension or annuity benefits and decrease monthly premiums for life
insurance, relative to the rates paid by men. These tables have been
the focus of most of the controversy concerning sexual discrimination
in insurance and pensions. Particular controversy has erupted in the United
States as a result of the Supreme Court holding the use of these tables
to be in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. An in-depth discussion
of these tables appears below., While it is asserted that the use of gender-
based tables is inconsistent with the principles of human rights law, it
should be noted that the tables are relatively insignificant. They are not
used for all pension plans; even when they are used, the difference in
pension premiums or benefits is only 15 percent. While the size of the
difference does not justify any distinction if it is inequitable, and while
the lower rate is obviously felt more keenly by women who already
have smaller pensions because of lower base salaries, the move away
from gender-based tables will not of itself significantly reduce poverty
among elderly women.
On the other hand, vesting provisions are much more significant
but have received much less attention.s While ostensibly gender-neutral,
these provisions work to the disadvantage of women as a class. The
requirement of a minimum number of years of service with the same
13 In 1981, the average income of men working full-time in Canada was $21,441; for women
working full-time it was $13,677. In Ontario, the differential was marginally greater. Men working
full-time made an average $21,758, and women made an average $13,554. Statistics Canada,
1981 Census of Canada, Cat. 92-930 (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, March 1984) Table 1.
14 See infra, section IV.
Is Vesting provisions will be discussed in detail infia, in section Im.
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employer, usually ten years, means that people changing jobs more
frequently do not acquire any rights to a pension. Similarly, a vesting
provision may require the attainment of a certain age prior to vesting.
Persons leaving the work force prior to that age, to stay at home with
children, for example, forfeit the right to receive a pension from their
prior employment. Consequently, vesting provisions are an important key
to changing the pattern of poverty among the elderly, and particularly,
elderly women.
Because of vesting provisions and the traditional pattern of women
working in the home, many women never acquire rights to their own
pension. Instead, they may acquire survivor rights to their spouse's pension,
but at generally only one-half of the original pension. It is a fallacy
that one can live for half the price of two, and women tend to bear
the brunt of that fallacy. Finally, the amount of the pension is set at
the date employment is terminated with generally no increase allowed
for inflation. Assuming a relatively modest inflation rate of six percent
per annum, the real value of a fixed-dollar pension will have fallen to
only 42 percent of its initial value after fifteen years.16 The value of
pensions for persons enjoying long periods of retirement is thus drastically
reduced.
The reason indexation and survival benefits are not more common
is their contractual nature. Spousal benefits of more than 50 percent
are now included for 4.6 percent of pension plan members,17 and there
is no reason why that could not be increased. Also, annual increases
tied to the cost of living could be included in a benefits scheme. The
difficulty with these suggested remedies is that earlier benefits would
have to be reduced to compensate for the increased benefits later on.
From the insurance perspective, the premiums to a pension or annuity
plan create a pool of money to be distributed following retirement.
Increasing spousal benefits and introducing indexation means that a
greater part of the pool will be disbursed later in the running of the
benefits, making less money available early in the benefit period. The
net average return on a policy to a pensioner or annuitant, however,
would be roughly the same.18 Notwithstanding this problem, periodic
increases in benefits and better spousal benefits ought to be included.
Pension plan members and purchasers of annuities wish to purchase a
16 J. E. Pesando, "The Indexing of Private Pensions: An Economist's Perspective on the Current
Debate" (1979) 5 Can. Pub. Pol'y 80 at 81.
17 Statistics Canada, Pensions, supra, note 7 at 81.
Is In fact, total income could be marginally higher under an indexed plan, as deferring payment
increases the interest the money in the pot produces, thus increasing the size of the pot. This
is offset by the fact that the annuitant delays receiving the economic use of the money.
1986]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
lifestyle for themselves and their spouses upon retirement. It is thus
desirable that the annuity or pension be structured to provide basically
the same lifestyle over time.
The combined factors of wage rates, vesting provisions, gender-based
tables, survival benefits, and indexation create a large gap between the
incomes of men and women from private pension plans. Of persons
reporting pension income in 1981, men reported an average income of
$5,613; women reported only $3,663.19
The result is that a disproportionately large number of elderly women
are very poor. In 1980, 57 percent of women aged sixty-five or older
had incomes of less than $5,000 per year, 71 percent had annual incomes
of less than $6,000.20
In response to this, women's groups have lobbied for improvements
to the C/QPP, OAS and GIS. The Women Workers Committee of the
Canadian Labour Congress makes the point this way:
For most women, the Canadian pension system is a one-tiered system. It consists
of public pension benefits. This is demonstrably true for women currently over
65 and is likely to be true for women for the foreseeable future. Thus the adequacy
of women's incomes after age 65 will depend fundamentally on the adequacy
of benefits provided by the OAS, GIS and C/QPP programs. Pension reform proposals
that presume that people over 65 will derive substantial benefits from occupational
pension plans and private savings do not reflect the experience of women.
2'
The focus of this paper on the third tier of the retirement income system
should not be perceived as a dismissal of that approach. It is, nonetheless,
important to examine how the current system of private pensions, annuities,
and life insurance works to the disadvantage of women, in the hope
that poverty among women may be reduced in the long term through
reform of the third tier.
Focussing on this third tier presupposes a specific view of insurance
law. In his 1961 article, "The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A
Preliminary Inquiry in the Theory of Insurance Law,"22 Professor Spencer
Kimball identifies a number of objectives particular to the insurance
industry at which regulation should aim. The first of these is solidity.23
The successful and continued operation of the insurance enterprise itself
is ensured by way of regulation of reserves, diversification of investments,
protection against spurious claims and other matters intended to ensure
19 Statistics Canada, Pensions, supra, note 7 at 90.
20 NAC, "Women and Pensions" supra, note 6 at 3.
21 Canadian Labour Congress, Women Workers Committee, "Submission to the Parliamentary
Task Force on Pension Reform" (Ottawa: CLC, 1983) at i.
22 (1961) 45 Minnesota L. Rev. 471.
23 Ibid. at 478.
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the long-term stability of the industry. Not only must the industry be
trustworthy, it must be perceived to be trustworthy. Since the public is
buying peace of mind, insurance regulation should see that this peace
of mind continues. Kimball's second broad criterion is equity.24 Insurance
regulation aims at equity between the policyholders and the company,
among classes of policyholders, and among individual policyholders. The
requirement is one of fairness to all. All of this is beyond reproach,
but one must recognize that equity is not definable simply with reference
to the principles of insurance law. Concepts of equity result from a wide
variety of social and legal sources, and may, in fact, conflict with other
insurance aims such as solidity.25
The insurance industry must be seen in its broader social and political
context. Kimball's article contains a second set of objectives, extrinsic
to the insurance industry. This second set includes democracy, liberty,
local protectionism, federalism, socialization of risk, and free enterpise.26
The objectives in this second set affect the objectives in the first set.
Ideas of liberty and democracy, for example, colour concepts of equity.
They may also affect the relative importance placed on solidity and equity.
The second set of objectives must not be viewed as static. Kimball wrote
in the United States during the "cold war," and this may account at
least in part for his emphasis on democracy, liberty, and free enterprise.
The Canadian situation in the 1980s emphasizes somewhat different
values. It is not that democracy, liberty, and free enterprise are no longer
laudable objectives, but rather our vision also addresses concerns about
human and civil rights, and the welfare state. Social objectives have always
been accorded a higher place on the Canadian agenda than on the
American and are of much greater concern now than they were when
Kimball wrote in 1961. These developments affect the Canadian concept
of equity. Accepting the arguments below would entail significant changes
24 Ibid. at 486. Kimball calls this criterion aequum et bonum.
25 Kimball himself recognizes this fact. See, for example, his comments concerning the use
of race as a factor in rate-making:
The danger of inequity resulting from a priori classification is easily illustrated... Negroes
have often been "rated up" in life insurance, based on the undeniable fact that mortality
experience for all Negroes is less favourable than experience for all whites. It requires little
sophistication to appreciate the danger in using these categories, for such factors as a less
favorable public health environment may well bias the statistics. While reliance on the race
classification will protect the company, the classification is too crude, for it sweeps within
the disfavoured class many who should receive more favorable treatment A desire to eliminate
this particular inequity as in conflict with fundamental moral notions about equal treatment
of races has led to statutes forbidding the use of race as a classification. A more refined
statistical apparatus which isolated and used the true causal factors would probably exclude
it too.
Kimball, ibid. at 496 [footnotes omitted].
26 Kimball, ibid. at 501.
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in the pension and insurance industry. That, in turn, would challenge
traditional principles of solidity. The task is to find transitional approaches
to attain equity with minimal compromise of solidity.
I. LEGISLATIVE OVERVIEW
Before discussing vesting provisions and gender-based mortality
tables, it will be useful to identify the various statutes at play, and the
general effects of each. Pension plans in Ontario are under the jurisdiction
of the Pension Benefits Act.27 That Act provides for a system of registering
pension plans with the Ministry of Consumer and Corporate Affairs.
Plans are to be run by trustees or are to be funded through insurance
companies.8 The Pension Benefits Act also contains legal restrictions on
vesting provisions.
Pension plans are also governed by the Employment Standards Act.29
Section 34(2) of the Act prohibits distinctions, exclusions, or preferences
based on age, sex, or marital status, subject to the regulations. Of primary
importance in that regard is Regulation 282, which allows actuarially
based distinctions in voluntary employee-pay-all pension and life insur-
ance plans, money purchase plans, and pension conversion options.30 The
regulation makes it clear, however, that a different rate of contribution
by the employer does not offend the Act when that different rate is required
to provide equal benefits in pensions or life insurance.31
All pensions, annuities, and life insurance are contained under the
definition of 'life insurance' in section 1(35) of the Insurance Act.32 A
number of provisions protect against unfair discrimination in the industry.
Under section 94(2), the Superintendent of Insurance has an obligation
to report to the Minister of Consumer and Commercial Relations any
policy which is "unfair, fraudulent, or not in the public interest," and
the Minister may prohibit the issuing of that policy. Section 117 provides
a limited prohibition of class-based discrimination but makes no reference
to gender discrimination:
117. Any insurer that discriminates unfairly between risks in Ontario because
of the race or religion of the insured is guilty of an offence.
27 R.S.O. 1980, c. 373.
28 Statistics Canada, Pensions, supra, note 6 at 21. The remaining groups and members were
in government-sponsored plans.
29 R.S.O. 1980, c. 137.
30 See R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 282, ss 2, 5, 6.
31 Ibid., ss 2(e) (pensions), and 5(b) (life insurance).
32 R.S.O. 1980, c. 218.
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Section 393(b) includes the following in the definition of "unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance":
393(b)(ii) any unfair discrimination between individuals of the same class and
of the same expectation of life, in the amount or payment or return of premiums,
or rates charged by it [presumably, the insurer] for contracts of life insurance
or annuity contracts, or in the dividends or other benefits payable thereon or in
the terms and conditions thereof...
are deemed "unfair or deceptive acts or practices." These practices are
made offences by section 394. No criteria are offered for defining classes.
The Ontario Human Rights Code33 provides specific protection from
discrimination on the basis of sex in the areas of services, accommodation,
contracts, and employment. Because the Supreme Court of Canada held
insurance in British Columbia to be a "service... customarily available
to the public,"34 it is arguable that insurance falls within the jurisdiction
of the Ontario Human Rights Code. Insurance contracts are also covered
by section 3, which provides the right to contract on equal terms.35 This
protection from discrimination is restricted by section 21:
21. The right under sections 1 and 3 to equal treatment with respect to services
and to contract on equal terms, without discrimination because of ... sex ...
is not infringed where a contract of ... life.., insurance or a contract of group
insurance between an insurer and an association or person other than an employer,
or a life annuity, differentiates or makes a distinction, exclusion or preference
on reasonable and bona fide grounds because of... sex....
Similarly, pension plans, a term of employment, fall within the
protection of section 4. This protection is limited by section 24(2):
24(2) The right under section 4 to equal treatment with respect to employment
without discrimination because of... sex ... is not infringed by an employee
superannuation or pension plan or fund or a contract of group insurance between
an insurer and an employer that complies with the Employment Standards Act
and the regulations thereunder.
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is still a loose cannon
on the deck of the Canadian legal system. It remains unclear whether
the Charter even applies to private action, or at the very least how the
33 S.O. 1981, c. 53.
34 See Insurance Corporation of British Columbia v. Heerspink [1982] 2 S.C.R. 145; 137 D.L.R.
(3d) 219.
35 Bates v. Zurich Insurance Company (1985), 6 C.H.R.R. D/2948 (Ont. Bd of Inquiry). This
decision is currently under appeal.
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courts will draw the line between private and governmental activity.36
No one can be quite sure yet how the courts will interpret section 15,
the anti-discrimination section, and particularly how legislation relating
to human rights will be dealt with.37
The only thing which can be said with certainty at this time is that
the Charter does cover the actions of government, both in its legislative
capacity and in the day-to-day running of government agencies and Crown
corporations. Possible challenges to legislation are problematic. Generally,
the legislation at issue is of two types. First, it may be partially corrective.
The vesting provisions of the Pension Benefits Act are an example. They
partially correct a situation which was worse prior to their enactment.
It shall be argued below that they continue to be discriminatory in their
effect. Challenging the vesting provisions, however, can only result in
their removal; it cannot result in the substitution of more progressive
provisions. Other human rights legislation as a whole is progressive, but
with important exceptions for pension or insurance plans. The Human
Rights Code is perhaps the clearest example, where the provisions dealing
36 Arguments for the extension of the Charter into the private sector may be found in D.
Gibson, "The Charter of Rights and the Private Sector" (1983) 12 Man. LU. 213, and B. Slattery,
"Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Does it Bind Private Persons" (1985) 63 Can. Bar Rev. 148.
These scholars argue that the phrase "within the authority" of the federal or provincial legislature,
as it appears in s. 32 of the Charter, is broad enough to encompass both governmental and private
activity. A second argument is that the jurisdiction section of the Charter, s. 32, does not restrict
the application of the Charter, but merely makes it clear that governments are bound by the Charter.
For the contrary view, see K. Swinton, "Application of the Canadian Charter or Rights and
Freedoms" in W.S. Tarnopolsky and G.A. Beaudoin, ed., The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedonm"
Commentary (Toronto: Carswell, 1982) and P. Hogg, The Canada Act 1982 Annotated (Toronto:
Carswell, 1982) at 77. Arguments that the application of the Charter is restricted to governmental
activity tend to rely, implicitly or explicitly, on the Canadian legal tradition, whereby the constitution
is fundamentally a regulator of government conduct. In addition, the maxim expresslo unius est
exiusio alterus is often said to require that the explicit inclusion of government action in s. 32
implicitly excludes non-government action from the scope of the Charter.
The preponderance of cases at this time would seem to limit in theory the effect of the Charter
to government action. It remains to be seen how the line between government and private action
will be drawn. American constitutional protection, for example, extends to all aspects of 'state
action'. Thus purely private activity is beyond the scope of constitutional intervention, but should
a dispute be brought before the court, the state becomes involved by virtue of enforcing the agreement
and constitutional protections may apply: see, for example, Shel!y v. Kramer, (1948) 334 U.S. I
(S.Ct.). Notwithstanding this broad approach, the setting of auto insurance rates has been held
not to involve state action: Murphy v. Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company 422 A.2d 1097 (P.A.
Super.).
The 'state action' approach has been held to be an inappropriate tool for interpreting the
Charter at least once: see Bhindi v. British Columbia Projectionists Local 348 (1985), 63 B.C.L.R.
352, (1986) 29 D.L.R. (4th) 47 (B.C. S.C.). It remains to be seen if higher courts agree, and if
not, whether the Murphy decision will be followed in this country.
37 For an expansive interpretation, see Re Blainey and Ontario Hockey Association (1986),
54 O.R (2d) 513 (Ont. C.A.). For a much more restrictive view of s. 15, see the trial judgment
in Biainey at 52 O.R. (2d) 225, and the decision of the British Columbia Supreme Court in Harrison
v. University of British Columbia (1986, unreported).
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with insurance restrict the otherwise progressive thrust of the legislation.
The judicial precedents in this area are to date so few that a consistent
doctrine cannot be ascertained, and any discussion would be largely
speculative.
At a minimum, the Charter's applicability will be limited to pension
plans and employment-related life insurance plans for employees of
governments, government agencies, and crown corporations. Even on
this assumption, there may be limited indirect effects on the private sector,
particularly in its dealings with the public sector. The American case
of Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred
Compensation Plans v. Norris8 will serve as an example. That case
concerned a money-purchase pension plan in a government institution
where the employee rolled over contributions to a private company which
in turn provided the employee with a life annuity. There was a choice
of private companies available, all of which offered lower periodic
payments to women on the basis of gender-based mortality tables. The
court found a violation of title VII of the American Civil Rights Act,
notwithstanding that Act's jurisdictional limitation to government. The
fact that the annuities were offered by private companies offered the
employer no defence.39 Governments are covered by the non-
discrimination provisions of the Charter, and, on the Norris precedent,
pressure may be placed on the insurance and pension industry to adopt
the Charter standard, at least in their dealings with government.
II. VESTING
Section 20(1)(a) of the Pension Benefits Act contains the most
restrictive vesting provisions permitted under Ontario law. This provision
holds that employees covered by a pension plan are entitled to receive
a pension when (a) they have either worked for an employer for a
continuous period of ten years or participated in the plan for a continuous
period of ten years, whichever occurs first; and (b) they attain the age
of forty-five years. Section 20(3)(a) permits pension plans to adopt a
smaller number of years or a lower age requirement for vesting. In Canada,
16 percent of the plans had no vesting provisions other than the legislative
standard of their province. Of the remainder, only 2.6 percent of members
were required to meet age standards at all. Forty percent of members
were required to serve for ten years in the plan prior to vesting; for
38 (1983) 103 S.Ct. 3492.
39 Ibid. at 3500.
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15 percent, five years of service was required, and for 8 percent, less
than five years. Immediate vesting was available for an additional
5 percent of members,40 almost exclusively executives.,'
These vesting provisions work to the particular disadvantage of
women. In the United States, only about 15 percent of women in pension
plans are employed long enough to obtain vesting., While 58 percent
of women between the ages of twenty and sixty-four are in the workforce,43
and 30.6 percent of these women are covered by pension plans,44 a much
smaller number will ever collect anything.s Those that do may collect
a much smaller pension, as pension credits earned during previous
employment count for nothing unless the pension vested during that
employment period. The result is that women have pension credits paid
on their behalf for much of their lives and yet may never receive any
benefit. The contributions remain in the pension fund and subsidize those
pensions which vest.
Given such a significant discrepancy in coverage, there is a dis-
appointing lack of academic literature and statistics on the matter. We
do know that in 1981, there were 2.3 million senior citizens in Canada,
well over half of whom were women. Only 327,095 of these women
reported any pension income on their tax returns,46 and this figure includes
both women who are receiving pensions in their own right and women
receiving survivor's benefits from a spouse's pension.
The most recent statistics concerning termination of employment
by gender, age, and length of service are American and are contained
in Bernstein's now somewhat dated book The Future of Private Pensions.47
40 All these statistics are from Statistics Canada, Pensions, supra, note 7 at 42. Recall that
these are Canadian statistics. Vesting at the level of five years and below may be higher in these
statistics than it is in Ontario, reflecting the five year vesting provisions of the Manitoba Pension
Benefits Act, S.M. 1975, c. 38, and the more complex vesting provisions in Saskatchewan.
41 Telephone interview with I. Nastajus, Assistant Superintendent (Operations), Ontario Pension
Commission, 28 February 1986.
42 The Non-Discrimination in Insurance Act of 1983: Hearings into H.R 100 Before the SubComr.
on Commerce Transportation, and Tourism, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (22 and 24 February 1983) at
113. A comparable figure was not given for men, although discussion indicates that such a figure
would be significantly higher.
43 NAC, "Women and Pensions," supra, note 6 at 1.
44 Statistics Canada, Pensions, supra, note 7 at 13.
45 15% x 30.6% = 4.6% of women in the workforce will receive private pension income
based on their own employment. This is an extremely rough estimate, as both the 30.6% and
the 15% figures are open to change. The 15 percent figure may be particularly likely to change,
given the changing role of women in the work force.
46 Statistics Canada, Pensions, supra, note 7 at 89.
47 M. Bernstein, The Future of Private Pensions (New York: Collier Macmillan, 1964). Because
the statistics are twenty years old, they are reproduced with reservations.
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Table I: Utility Combine,8









Table II: Manufacturing Company49










These tables show that vesting provisions affect men and women very
differently and illustrate a potential human rights issue. Two persons
are hired to do identical jobs. The woman typically obtains a pay packet
with some benefits. The man receives his pay packet, benefits, and a
payment towards a pension he is likely to receive. Because she typically
gets nothing, it is unreasonable to argue that the woman has equal access
to this pension payment.
Legal remedies in this area are limited. The Pension Benefits Act
specifically mandates the use of the vesting provisions and a Charter
challenge to those provisions would be unproductive. Even if successful,
it would merely void the existing provisions, but not force the government
to introduce new legislation requiring vesting provisions more favourable
to women. The Ontario Human Rights Code also is unlikely to provide
48 Ibid. at 306. Age refers to 'central age', that is, 22 refers to ages 20 to 24, 27 to ages
25 to 29, etc. Age 17 refers to all ages below 20. Age refers to the age of the employee at the
commencement of employment. For example, of employees commencing work at ages under 20,
90.1 per cent of the women and 42.9 per cent of the men do not complete ten years of service.
49 Ibid. at 312.
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a remedy. While the vesting provisions do prima facie contravene the
constructive discrimination provisions contained in section 10 of the Code,
the vesting provisions are explicitly permitted by legislation. To find that
these contravened the Code would, in effect, be using the Code to overrule
the Pension Benefits Act. While the Code does in theory have the power
to do this,o there are no reported cases where this occurred. A challenge
to the provisions of the Employment Standards Act faces the same
limitations. Section 15 of the Charter might provide a legal attack for
employees of governments and crown corporations.
The vesting provisions are gender-neutral on their face. Therefore,
in order to mount a successful Charter challenge, it will be necessary
to persuade the court to read constructive discrimination, or adverse effect
discrimination, into section 15; the existing precedents suggest that the
courts are prepared to make such a finding.5,
This conclusion is supported by Ontario Human Rights Commission
and O'Malley v. Simpsons Sears52 in which the Supreme Court of Canada
held that, notwithstanding that there was no intent to discriminate and
notwithstanding that the employer's requirement for employees to work
on Saturdays was neutral on its face, the Code had been infringed. While
O'Malley is not directly applicable, as it concerned conditions of em-
ployment rather than unequal benefits, it does indicate how the courts
might approach the vesting issue.
In O'Malley, Mr. Justice McIntyre, speaking for a unanimous court,
discussed constructive discrimination in the following terms:
[Adverse effect discrimination] arises where an employer for genuine business
reasons adopts a rule or standard which is on its face neutral, and which will
apply equally to all employees, but which has a discriminatory effect upon a
prohibited ground on one employee or group of employees in that it imposes,
because of some special characteristic of the employee or group, obligations,
penalties, or restrictive conditions not imposed on other members of the work
force... I am of the opinion that this Court may consider adverse effect
discrimination as described in these reasons a contradiction of the terms of the
Code. An employment rule honestly made for sound economic or business reasons,
equally applicable to all to whom it is intended to apply, may yet be discriminatory
if it affects a person or group of persons differently from others to whom it may
apply.53
50 Supra, note 33 at s. 46(2).
51 See, for example, R. v. Big M. Drug Mart [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, [1985] 3 W.W.R. 48 (S.C.C.),
where the court held that a violation of s. 2(a) of the Charter could result from either a discriminatory
purpose or a discriminatory effect. While that case was decided under s. 2, there is no obvious
reason that the reasoning would be different under s. 15.
52 (1988), 7 C.H.RR. D/3102 (S.C.C.).
53 Ibid. at para. 24772.
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On this analysis a strong argument can be made that the vesting provisions
are discriminatory. The discriminatory effect results from a "special
characteristic of the ... group," specifically, the tendency of women
not to stay in one job for long periods of time.
The only obvious stumbling block is whether the discriminatory effect
is "upon a prohibited ground." Does this mean that there must be an
intrinsic connection between the effect and the prohibited ground? Nothing
about being female compels women to leave their jobs. On the other
hand, it is not arbitrary that women change jobs more frequently than
men.
It is not clear how much weight ought to be placed on that single
phrase. In O'Malley the complainant could not work Saturdays because
of a concrete tenet of her religion, but such an intrinsic connection between
the discriminatory category and the restrictive condition has not existed
in other cases. Instructive in this regard is Griggs v. Duke Power,54 a
leading American case in constructive discrimination referred to in
O'Malley. In Griggs, a high school diploma or the passing of a standardized
intelligence test was required for employment, although neither was shown
to be significantly related to job performance. These requirements had
the effect of screening out a disproportionate number of blacks from
employment. The court held these requirements to be discriminatory
without an explicit causal connection between being black and not meeting
these requirements. The fact that black people tended to be affected
differently was enough. In fact, the parallel with the vesting provisions
is very close: no doubt many of the blacks in Griggs "chose" not to
finish high school in much the same way as women "choose" not to
remain with one employer for a long period of time.
Assuming a prima facie case of discrimination has been made out,
a Charter challenge would have to meet the section 1 override provision.
The onus would then be shifted to the person defending the vesting
provisions to demonstrate on a balance of probabilities that they are
reasonable limits to the Charterrights, prescribed by law, and demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society. There is no question that vesting
provisions are prescribed by law, as they are contained in the Pension
Benefits Act. The reasonableness criterion is less easy to satisfy. O'Malley
and Griggs both refer to the business purpose of the discriminatory
requirements. In Griggs, the issue was whether the employment require-
ments actually had a business purpose. In OMalley, it was held that
the employer should be required to make reasonable accommodation
to solve the problem of discrimination, but that such a duty of accom-
54 (1971), 91 S.Ct. 849.
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modation did not extend to the point where "undue hardship" is imposed
on the employer in the conduct of the business.
The business purposes of longer vesting provisions are two-fold.
To the pension industry, they are administratively convenient. To the
employer, pensions provide an incentive for employees to continue on
in the employment.55 Both of these legitimate business purposes distinguish
this case from Griggs, where no business purpose was found. Both purposes,
however, can be achieved through other means. Employment law already
contains a number of mechanisms to create stability in a company
workforce. The simplest of these is the long-term employment contract.
Merit pay increases also induce employees to remain. In addition, in
defined benefit plans,56 long-term employees would still do better than
short-term employees, assuming the income level of the employee rises
over time, as these plans are normally based on both years of service
and highest income level reached over a period of time.s3 Movement
to defined benefit plans would also, therefore, assist in meeting the
objectives of the employer.
The problems of the pension industry are not as easily solved. Some
headway could be made by allowing companies to transfer pension credits.
Thus, several companies, each with a small pension owed to an individual,
could consolidate payment to that person in one company. This would
facilitate the administration of these pension plans. The pension industry,
moreover, does not need ten-year vesting periods to ensure that pensions
are of significant size. Manitoba has recently amended its Pension Benefits
Act such that the maximum vesting period will be two years by 1990.58
That is a reasonable vesting period, and it might well be an appropriate
limit for the court to adopt in determining what is reasonable under
section 1 of the Charter.
Under a Charter challenge, a finding that present vesting provisions
violate section 15 rights would affect only government employees and
employees of crown corporations. But the argument for constructive
discrimination is as strong in the private sector as in the public, and
the fact that there is no legal remedy for private sector employees does
not justify the status quo. Maximum vesting periods ought to be sig-
55 L. Ruben and S. Elliott, "Sex Discrimination and Sex-Based Mortality Tables" (1973) 53
Bos. U. L. Rev. 624.
56 That is, plans where the monthly benefit upon retirement is calculated as a function of
salary upon retirement, years of service, and, sometimes, age. These are in contradistinction from
money-purchase plans, where the monthly benefit upon retirement is calculated as a function of
money contributed to by and on behalf of the employee and the employee's life expectancy.
57 It is arguable that this, too, creates a problem of constructive discrimination against women,
but this problem is much more difficult to solve.
58 An Act to Amend the Pension Benefits Amendment Act, S.M. 1982-83-84, c. 79.
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nificantly reduced by legislation. A province-wide use of shortened vesting
periods will make economically viable a large-scale system to deal with
rights to small pensions. Bernstein advocates a centralized clearing house
system, allowing payment of a number of small entitlements to be
transferred to one company.59 Such a system might well require economies
of scale to become viable. Changing vesting provisions is one way to
make significant changes in the pattern of poverty in senior citizens and
particularly senior women. The changes would be inexpensive to gov-
ernment,60 and on insurance and labour law principles would be more
equitable as the benefits paid out of plans would be more likely to be
received by the employee upon whose behalf the premiums were made.
IV. GENDER-BASED MORTALITY TABLES
A. Conflicting Theories on Gender-Based Tables
The use of gender-based mortality tables has been the focus of debate
in the United States regarding sexual discrimination in pensions and
annuities. The accuracy of these tables must be accepted. Actuarial tables
demonstrate that on average, women live about six years longer than
men. As a result, the average payout on an annuity policy is greater
for women than for men, and women must pay greater premiums to
receive the same monthly annuity. At this time, to receive an equal monthly
annuity, women must pay premiums roughly 15 percent larger than men.6,
In life insurance, the situation is reversed. As premiums are normally
paid periodically up to the death of the policyholder, the average woman
will make more payments than the average man, and the size of each
premium is correspondingly reduced.62
59 Bernstein, supra, note 47, c. 10 at 265.
60 Amendments might even save the federal government money, by reducing the amount of
GIS payable. Unfortunately, the federal government can only regulate concerning federal companies.
The important amendments must be made in provincial legislatures, where there is no impetus
to save federal money.
61 For a full discussion of how premiums are calculated from actuarial tables, see G. Benston,
"The Economics of Gender Discrimination in Employee Fringe Benefits: Manhart Revisited" (1982)
49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 489 at 497.
62 In the United States, mortality tables normally include men only. A woman applying for
an annuity or for life insurance would be rated according to these tables, but she would have
her life expectancy predicted as if she were a younger man. The difference between the ages
is referred to as a 'set back'. There appears to be a practice in the United States whereby different
set backs are used for women buying different policies. A woman buying a life insurance policy
might be assessed with a set back of three years, while a woman buying an annuity might be
assessed with a set back of six years. There is no indication that comparable distinctions are made
on the type of policy purchased by men: see H.R Hearings, supra, note 42, at 211, 212, 232;
S. Kimball, "Reverse Sex Discrimination: Manhart' 1979 Am. Bar Foundation Research J. 83 at
109; P. Sharp, "Insurance as a Public Accommodation" (1984) 15 Colum. Human Rights L. R.
227 at 230.
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In Ontario, gender-based tables are used pervasively in the private
insurance market. The Employment Standards Act contains a general
prohibition of gender-based distinctions in pension plans, subject to the
regulations. In effect, the regulations restrict the prohibition in the Act
to defined benefit plans which are either mandatory or non-contributory,
and to mandatory or non-contributory life insurance plans. This is still
very significant. In 1982, 93.7 percent of Canadians covered by pension
plans had defined benefit plans.63 In addition, most members are in plans
where participation is compulsory. In 1982,81.3 percent of new employees
of companies with pension plans were required to participate; only 14.7
percent were covered by voluntary plans.6,
The use of gender-based mortality tables has been closely scrutinized
in the United States. The Supreme Court has held in two recent cases
that the use of such tables constitutes a violation of the American Civil
Rights Act of 1964. The first case, City of Los Angeles, Department of
Water and Power v. Manhart,65 dealt specifically with the requirement
that female employees of the defendant were required to make larger
contributions to the company's pension fund than male employees. The
court held that the subsidy of one group by another group was not
inherently discriminatory:
For when insurance risks are grouped, the better risks always subsidize the poorer
risks. Healthy persons subsidize medical benefits for the less healthy; unmarried
workers subsidize the pensions of married workers; persons who eat, drink, or
smoke to excess may subsidize pension benefits for persons whose habits are more
temperate. Treating different classes of risks as though they were the same for
purposes of group insurance is a common practice that has never been considered
inherently unfair. To insure the flabby and the fit as though they were equivalent
risks may be more common than treating men and women alike; but nothing
more than habit makes one "subsidy" seem less fair than the other.6
However, Mr. Justice Stevens, speaking for the majority, found the
disparity in this case to be a violation of Title VII of the Act, which
It may be defensible to use different set offs, depending on the type of policy. Arguably, policy
applicants are at least partly self-selecting, so that persons expecting a long life will buy annuities
and persons expecting a short life will buy life insurance. To make this distinction with regard
to women and not to men is discriminatory, however. In Ontario, different actuarial tables are
used for annuities and life insurance, resulting from industry experience with each type of contract.
Annuity tables provide complete information regarding both men and women. Set offs are used
only on life insurance tables: Personal interview with B. Newman, Senior Actuary, and F. Rahman,
Actuary, Office of the Superintendent of Insurance, 5 March 1986. It is difficult to judge whether
these tables include the discriminatory factor used in the United States, but it appears unlikely.
63 Statistics Canada, Pensions, supra, note 7 at 27. The statistics concerning membership reflect
the fact that larger plans tend to be defined benefit.
64 Ibid. at 26. Here, the disproportion with the number of plans is even greater. Only 37.1
percent of the plans were compulsory, 60.5 per cent were voluntary.
65 (1978), 98 S.Ct. 1370.
66 Ibid. at 1376. Footnotes omitted.
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prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex. First, he held that Congress
had made it clear, as a matter of policy, that classifications based on
sex were illegal. Second, he held that, even if the statutory direction
has been less clear, the thrust of the legislation directed the court's attention
to fairness to individuals, rather than fairness to groups. He held that
most of the difference in mortality rates was the result of differences
in social factors, specifically the prevalence of smoking among men,
and not the result of innate differences between sexes. Consequently,
the court found the association of these social factors with gender to
be discriminatory. Five years after Manhart, in 1983, the Supreme Court
extended this reasoning to plans where contributions were equal, but
monthly benefits were smaller upon retirement.67
In the last few years, bills have been placed before both the American
Senate and the House of Representatives which would have disallowed
sexual discrimination in all insurance and pension plans. The most
significant of these, the Non-Discrimination in Insurance Act of 1983,68
was defeated, primarily because of the costs of implementation.69 But
it remains clear that gender-based actuarial tables discriminate on the
basis of sex. The argument that gender-based actuarial tables are not
discriminatory is premised upon the notion that germane distinctions which
result in two classes being treated unequally are not discriminatory.
Professor George Benston, makes the point this way:
First, I assume that the goal of both the Equal Pay Act and Title VII is to have
individuals treated equally with regard to their race, color, religion, sex, and national
67 Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity and Tax Deferred Compensation
Plans v. Norris, (1983), 103 S. Ct. 3492, 463 U.S. 1073. For a recent decision on much the same
point, see Spirt v. Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association (U.S.C.A.), (1984) 735 F.2d. 23.
68 Supra, note 42.
69 United States Department of Labor estimates the cost of implementation at $1.7 billion
(U.S.) per year in the early years (supra, note 5 at 63). Industry representatives placed the costs
much higher. Gender-based distinctions have been prohibited throughout the insurance industry
in Montana, by s. 1 of Montana H. B. 358, 40th Leg., 2d Sess. (1983):
1. Discrimination in Insurance and retirement plans: It is an unlawful discriminatory practice
for any financial institution or person to discriminate solely on the basis of sex or marital
status in the issuance or operation of any type of insurance policy, plan, or coverage or
in any pension or retirement plan, program, or coverage, including discrimination in regard
to rates or premiums and payments or benefits.
The following less ambitious provision, which applies only to pension plans, was adopted in Manitoba
in 1983 (S.M. 1982-83-84, c. 79, section 14). It amends section 21 of the Manitoba Pension Benefits
Act, supra, note 40:
21 (6.4) No pension plan shall provide for permit
(a) different rates or amounts of contributions by the members based on difference in sex;
or
(b) different pensions, annuities or benefits based on differences in sex; or
(c) different options as to pensions, annuities or benefits based on differences in sex; or
(d) the inclusion in or exclusion from membership in the pension plan of employees on
the basis of the sex of the employees.
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origin in the sense that these personal attributes will not be treated invidiously.
Thus the law does not prevent employers from distinguishing among individuals
with respect to these attributes as long as the distinctions are demonstrably germane
to the tasks for which a person is employed and do not mask otherwise illegal
discrimination. I base this assumption on a recognition that individuals naturally
differ and that some of these individual differences may be related to race, color,
religion, sex, and national origin. If these differences are not taken into account
in a noninvidious way, affected individuals may be harmed or benefited as unfairly
as if the differences were considered invidiously.70
The argument continues that actuarial tables show women live longer
than men. As a result, women receive more payments from a pension
plan or life annuity than men of a similar age. Plans providing equal
monthly benefits to women and men are more valuable to women. On
this argument, fairness requires that women either pay more into the
plan or have monthly benefits reduced. In short, as long as the present
values of the plans are equal, there is no discrimination.
The difficulty with this argument is that it is impossible to predict
accurately when an individual will die. Consequently, the actual present
value of the annuity is impossible to predict for a given individual. The
present value argument assumes that gender is a major relevant con-
sideration in assessing life expectancy. The fact that the individual is
a woman does not necessarily affect present value for her plan. Admittedly,
this problem will arise with whatever risk group is chosen. However,
human rights law has singled out specific factors, including sex, as
inappropriate criteria for distinction. Implicit in the present-value approach
is that notwithstanding human rights law, gender is the appropriate
criterion to ascertain present value. Even if it is defensible on practical
grounds, it concerns the reasonableness of discrimination, not the fact
that discrimination is occurring.
The broader question is whether in fact one ought to use a present
value approach or a monthly benefit approach in ascertaining equality.
At least in the pension arena, a monthly benefit approach is defensible.
The terms of pension plans are settled in negotiations between employers
and employees or unions. While cost is a major factor to the employer,
what is really bargained about from the employee perspective is the
lifestyle to be enjoyed upon retirement. This argument is reinforced by
the fact that in at least one Ontario case, a union requested that unisex
tables be used in calculating benefits. Their problem was not in convincing
70 Benston, supra, note 60 at 493. It is difficult to reconcile this principle with the principle
enunciated by Steven I above, that the thrust of Title VII is to treat individuals according to individual
characteristics rather than group characteristics, a principle fundamental to human rights law. The
two appear to be reconcilable only when the characteristic of the group applies of necessity to
all or virtually all individual members of the group.
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their members or their employer, but rather in finding an insurance
company prepared to use those tables.7 On this basis, the appropriate
criterion for judging equality is not present value, but monthly benefits.
The literature resulting from Manhart focuses on the existence of
discrimination based on present value assumptions, and the reasonableness
of that discrimination. At least in the area of pensions, this has the implied
premise that the insurance law framework rather than the labour law
framework should apply. There is no obvious justification for such an
implied premise.
The comparable argument is more difficult to make regarding
individual life annuity contracts by insurance companies. While it is
reasonable to view employee plans in a labour law context, the negotiation
of a private contract between insurer and insured cannot reasonably be
viewed in this light. It remains true that annuities may be bought in
place of pensions by persons not covered by pensions, and those people
are concerned about purchasing a lifestyle. However, the negotiation is
with a private insurer, not with the employer, and persons providing
any resulting cross-subsidy are not represented in those negotiations as
they are in negotiation of a group plan. The analysis of the use of gender-
based actuarial tables for these contracts must therefore be based strictly
in the competing values of human rights and insurance principles. The
principles of labour law cannot apply to these contracts.
Recognizing that even within this more limited framework an
argument can be made that discrimination exists in the use of gender-
based tables, it becomes necessary to consider the reasonableness of this
discrimination. There are three basic arguments that the discrimination
is reasonable: (1) it is based on sound actuarial practice; (2) the difference
in mortality is intrinsic to gender, that is, longevity is biological and
not environmental; (3) any discriminatory effect is justified by various
social policy benefits. The first of these arguments is discussed in Manhart
in three distinct forms. In its basic form, it is similar to the argument
that the tables do not discriminate at all because benefit packages are
of equal present value. Women as a class, it is argued, are treated equally
with men as a class. The court in Manhart did not accept this argument:
In this case, however, the Department argues that the absence of a discriminatory
effect on women as a class justifies an employment practice which, on its face,
discriminated against individual employees because of their sex. But even if the
Department's actuarial evidence is sufficient to prevent plaintiffs from establishing
a prima facie case on the theory that the effect of the practice on women as
a class was discriminatory, that evidence does not defeat the claim that the practice,
71 Interview with F. Rahman and B. Newman, supra. A company was eventually found that
would handle the policy.
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on its face, discriminated against every individual woman employed by the
Department
72
In its second form, it was argued that the distinction is not based
on gender, but rather on longevity, that is, that the discrimination arises
because they are members of classes which statistically live a relatively
longer or shorter time73 The court in Manhart also rejected this submission:
The Department argues that the different contributions exacted from men and
women were based on the factor of longevity rather than sex. It is plain, however,
that any individual's life expectancy is based on a number of factors, of which
sex is only one. The record contains no evidence that any factor other than the
employee's sex was taken into account in calculating the 14.84% differential between
the respective contributions by men and women. We agree with Judge Duniway's
observation that one cannot "say that an actuarial distinction based entirely on
sex is 'based on any factor other than sex'. Sex is exactly what it is based on." 74
A final version is that the insurance industry by its very nature is
different from other private enterprise institutions. Where normally it
is possible and appropriate to consider individuals as individuals, insurance
requires the prediction of future events. Insurance is thus of necessity
based on probabilities ascertained from a group classification.75 This
argument was also rejected in Manhart, by the court's decision to focus
on fairness to individuals rather than fairness to groups.76
Was the court in Manhart right? The counter-arguments presented
above rely on the premise that actuarial considerations negate any
discriminatory effect. Critics of Manhart do not grasp that, notwithstanding
the accuracy of actuarial tables, the tables may still be discriminatory
in a human rights context. Assume, for example, that the differences
in longevity were based exclusively on social habits more prevalent among
men, such as smoking and the consumption of alcohol. A man who
neither smoked nor drank would therefore have the same life expectancy
as a woman, but mortality tables would give him an artificially short
life expectancy. This would not be the result of his gender, but of the
72 Manhart, supra, note 64 at 1379.
73 This argument is particularly important in the American context, where the so-called Bennett
amendment to Title VII, allows sexual differentiations based on seniority systems, merit systems,
productivity systems, or on "a differential based on any other factor other than sex." The comparable
provision in the Canadian statutes to be referred to below is contained in s. 9(c) of the Ontario
Human Rights Code (supra, note 33), where 'equal' is defined as being "subject to all requirements,
qualifications, and considerations that are not a prohibited ground of discrimination." The effect
of the Code provision is probably very similar to the effect of the Bennett amendment.
74 Ibid. at 1377. The quotation from Duniway J. is at (1976) 553 F. 2d 581 at 588.
75 For a particularly strong defense of this argument, see Kimball, supra, note 61 at 118.
76 Mannhart, supra, note 64 at 1376.
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habits of other men. He has been discriminated against if he purchases
a life insurance policy where the actuarial table works to his disadvantage.
The conflict is that procedures which make sense in insurance are
not reconcilable with the basic principle of human rights law, that is,
that individuals are to be treated as individuals, unaffected by charac-
teristics possessed by the group. We generally think of this in the context
of stereotypes, for example, men smoke and drink more, and will therefore
die sooner. This is a stereotype, notwithstanding its statistical basis, because
it is not true for all men. Men for whom it is not true ought logically
to be covered by the protection from gender-based discrimination
accorded by human rights legislation. In short, the argument that the
tables discriminate in a reasonable way because they are actuarially sound
cannot stand because it fails to distinguish between causation and statistical
correlation"7 This leads directly to the second broad justification for the
reasonableness of gender-based tables: that the difference in longevity
is caused specifically by gender, rather than by some unrelated factor.
Much has been written on the 'biology or environment' debate. It
is submitted that social habits among men impact on the mortality tables.78
The analysis of Brilmayer and her colleagues supports this view:
77 I should note two arguments which appear in the literature, but which I find unconvincing.
Both deal with the statistical accuracy of the mortality tables. The first is that the vast bulk of
women who die may be 'matched' with a man who dies at the same age. This accounts for roughly
eighty to eighty-four per cent of the American population. Thus, the argument goes, knowing a
person's gender tells very little about when they will die (See L. Brilmayer et aL, "Sex Discrimination
in Employer-Sponsored Insurance Plans" (1980) 47 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 505 at 530. And Bernstein
and Williams, "Title VII and the Problem of Sex Classifications in Pension Programs" (1974)
74 Columbia L.R. 1203 at 1221.). This 80 or 84 percent figure is admittedly emotionally appealing;
it is not clear to me, however, what it in fact proves. When one is dealing with things as unpredictable
as human deaths, and a difference so small as a life expectancy of roughly eighteen years for
men and twenty-three years for women at the age of sixty, [Canada, Statistics Canada, Canada
Yearbook, 1985 (Ottawa, 1985) at 97] a significant overlap is to be expected. That does not somehow
undermine the actuarial value of the statistics, nor does it prima facie suggest that those statistics
are unreasonable.
The second argument I find relatively unhelpful occurs in Benston, supra, note 60 at 513.
Professor Benston discusses at some length the accuracy of the gender-based tables. This is in
part in response to Brilmayer's claim that gender is an inefficient criterion to be used in the prediction
of longevity (ibid at 511). The thrust of Benston's argument is that gender-based tables have been
accurate in predicting the number of people that will die in the various age groups. It is not clear
what that proves, however. Note that so-called unisex tables might very well be able to predict
the number of people that will die in the various age groups.
I submit that statistical correlations on their own may be of very limited use in arguing for
'reasonableness'. If they are useful, the accuracy test which will be of interest is how probable
it is that an individual will die relatively near to the longevity ascribed to him or her. It is clear
on that basis that unisex tables are less accurate than gender-based tables. No one, however, in
the literature that I have been able to locate, has discussed how much more inaccurate they would
in fact be.
78 For a more complete discussion of this complex topic, see Brilmayer et al, supra, note
76 at 539, and the response in Benston, supra, note 60 at 512. On balance, I have found the
Brilmayer article more convincing.
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Recent studies confirm that the widening of SMDs [sexual mortality differences]
up to 1970 may be traced principally to higher male mortality from arteriosclerotic
heart disease ... motor vehicle and other accidents, cirrhosis of the liver, and
suicide. These causes of death accounted for three-fourths of the SMD in the
United States in 1967. Behavioral factors such as smoking, drinking alcohol,
reckless driving, and the "coronary-prone" or "Type A" personality are implicated
in the etiology of each.79
Available evidence suggests that more men smoke than women and more
heavily.o A thirty-year-old person smoking two packages of cigarettes
per day has a life expectancy of approximately eight years shorter than
a non-smoker.8, This affects the mortality tables of men and women.82
Similarly, 11 percent of the deaths in Canada in 1978 were alcohol-
related.s Since men drink an average of three times the alcohol women
drink,84 it would seem reasonable that this would have an effect on the
gender-based tables. Finally, one would expect that if the difference were
entirely or primarily biological, the longer life expectancy for women
would be uniform across the world. It is not. In some places, particularly
in Asian countries, men have a higher life expectancy than women.85
Even the critics of Manhart have given some ground here. Kimball, in
fact, in a 1980 sequel to his major critique of Manhart, abandons any
claim to a biology-based theory, instead basing his argument on the
fact that gender differentials are "significant, stable, and practical to use."86
This leads to the third and final set of arguments regarding the
reasonableness of gender-based tables: that the advantages of using the
79 Brilmayer et aL, supra, note 76 at 552. Footnotes omitted.
80 See, for example, L. Bennett, Smoking and Morbidity in a Saskatchewan Sample (Saskatoon:
University of Saskatchewan, 1973) at 8.
81 United States, Surgeon-General, Smoking and Health (Vashington: GPO, 1979) c. 2. Note
especially c. 2 at 23.
82 Apparently, a relatively large number of smokers die in their twenties and early thirties:
Rahman and Newton, supra, note 60. It has been suggested that these deaths are not the result
of smoking-related diseases, but rather that smoking correlates with a lifestyle which includes,
for example, alcohol and fast cars. Some Ontario companies use smoking as a factor in setting
rates. As a parallel to my earlier argument regarding the 'reasonableness' of actuarial practices
per se, an argument could be made that screening according to smokers discriminates against those
smokers who do not share that lifestyle. This would be an issue, of course, only on life insurance
policies, as the suspect deaths occur prior to annuity payments commencing. This would not be
a problem under the Ontario Human Rights Code, as smoking is not a prohibited ground of
discrimination. The Superintendent of Insurance is unlikely to intervene, assuming the distinctions
are actuarially sound. Any argument of this sort would meet the problem that discrimination against
smokers does not have the social stigma of discrimination on sexual grounds.
83 Canada Year Book, 1985, supra, note 76 at 87.
84 R.L. Cosper, "Alcoholism" Canadian Encyclopedia (Edmonton: Hurtig, 1985) at 44.
85 Brilmayer et aL, supra, note 76 at 542.
86 S. Kimball, "Reprise on Manhart" 1980 Am. Bar Foundation Research J., 915 at 919.
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tables outweigh any discrimination that may occur. There are three
arguments, all based on the nature of the insurance industry:
1) the gender-based distinctions are workable, unlike other proposed
distinctions;
2) the removal of gender-related distinctions would result in cross-
subsidization; and
3) the distinctions are necessary to maintain the competitive nature
of the insurance industry.
It is argued that the gender-based distinctions are useful in the industry
because they are statistically significant, easily verifiable, and remain
constant over an individual's life. Simply stated, they are administratively
convenient. The class is easily definable and membership static.
The argument from convenience must be viewed with some skep-
ticism. Even allowing that the use of other criteria will cause some
problems, this is still not an argument for allowing sexual distinctions.
The very rigidity which makes the distinctions convenient also makes
them discriminatory. I have argued that biology is at most a partial
explanation of the difference in the mortality rates, yet biology entirely
determines the class into which an individual will be grouped. On a
broader level, convenience should rarely be permitted to take precedence
over human rights considerations.
The cross-subsidies argument states that the removal of gender-
based distinctions will result in men as a class subsidizing the annuity
policies of women as a class, as women would get more from the same
contributions. Such cross-subsidies are considered unacceptable to the
industry, the law being that each policy should pay its own way8 This
argument assumes that an alternative set of classifications could not be
created. If alternative criteria were developed, cross-subsidies might not
be increased significantly and might in fact be reduced.
Even if there is a resulting cross-subsidy, this is not necessarily
unacceptable. Throughout human rights law, the benefit of one group
must come at the cost of another.8s This is exemplified by the concept
of equal pay for work of equal value, under which, in a company with
limited resources, a pay equalization means a redistribution of the pie.
87 This is in fact required by s. 85(6) of the Insurance Act, supra, note 2.
8s The precisely comparable issue exists, for example, in the issue of decreased vesting periods.
Contributions are made on behalf of all employees, whether or not their pensions will vest. All
the contributions normally stay in the pension fund, subsidizing those pensions that will vest. As
a result, employees whose pensions vest, typically male, have been receiving a subsidy from those
employees whose pensions do not vest, largely females: Newton and Rahman, supra, note 60 see
also the remarks of Congresswoman Mikulski, supra, note 42 at 133. The shorter vesting provisions
would mean that there would be a payout based on more of the contributions, thus reducing these
subsidies. Higher contributions will have to be made to cover the loss of these subsidies. That
will work to the disadvantage of people whose pensions now vest, primarily men.
1986]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
Similarly, with the termination of gender-based distinctions, the increase
in benefits will no doubt come partly from decreased corporate profits
and smaller wage increases in the industry and partly from increasing
the cost of the pension and annuity product to men and the life insurance
product to women.
That leads to the argument that the competitive abilities of firms
will be undercut by the removal of their right to make relevant actuarial
distinctions. This argument overstates the case. It is not all actuarial
distinctions which would be restricted, but only those based on gender.
The competitive position of an individual company is unlikely to be
severely undercut in any case, as long as the distinctions are abolished
for all companies.
To conclude, the principles of human rights law are inconsistent
with the use of gender-based mortality tables. A strong argument can
thus be made for a prohibition of such tables.
B. Application of Statutes
One way to terminate the use of gender-based mortality tables would
be through the intervention of the Superintendent of Insurance. Under
section 94(2) of the Insurance Act, the superintendent must report to
the Minister any policy which is "unfair... or not in the public interest."
Are the actuarial tables unfair in the sense meant by the Act? There
is a tension between insurance principles and human rights principles
running throughout the Act. On the one hand, there is to be no
discrimination in rate-setting among people of the same life expectancy;89
yet, on the other hand, all policies are to be self-supporting. The Act
prohibits discriminatory rates based on race or religiongo whether or not
these different rates are actuarially justified. Some valid actuarial dis-
tinctions have thus already been restricted on the grounds of human
rights. Black people have a shorter life expectancy than white people,
but race cannot be considered.91 There is no meaningful distinction,
89 Insurance Act, supra, note 2 at s. 393(b)(ii).
90 Ibid. at s. 117.
91 See Brilmayer et aL, supra, note 76 at 512. Brilmayer presents the following table, reproduced
from Greville, "Some Trends and Comparisons of United States Life-Table Data: 1900-1971"
(1975) 1 National Centre for Health Statistics, (1975) No. 4 U.S. Decennial Life Tables for 1969-
71, Table 4 at 4-10 (Rockville, Md.: U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Public Health
Service).
Expectation of Life at Birth
(Selected Categories 1969-1971)
All persons 70.75 67.96
All males 67.04 63.85
All non-whites 64.95 62.64
All males 60.98 58.33
From this table, it would appear that race is a statistically more important factor than sex in determining
longevity.
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however, between actuarial tables based on race and those based on
gender.92
In the United States, courts have found a duty on the part of insurance
commissioners to consider human rights legislation in assessing fairness
in rate-setting. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Insurance Com-
missioner of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,93 involved "unfairly
discriminatory" rate-setting in the auto insurance market resulting from
gender-based distinctions. The Commissioner had disallowed the rates,
and this decision was upheld by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania:
The question presented, properly phrased, is whether the term "unfairly discrim-
inatory" must be read in light of the Equal Rights Amendment to our Pennsylvania
Constitution. Unquestionably, sex discrimination in this Commonwealth is now
unfair discrimination. It is a cardinal principle that ambiguous statutes should be
read in a manner consonant with the Constitution. To read the term "unfairly
discriminatory" as excluding sex discrimination would contradict the plain mandate
of the Equal Rights Amendment to our Pennsylvania constitution. Therefore, we
must affirm the decision of the Insurance Commissioner. We must do so because
the statute must be interpreted to include sex discrimination as one type of unfair
discrimination, and not because the Commissioner has the power to implement
the public policy of this Commonwealth in the absence of legislative direction.
94
The Pennsylvania human rights provisions are constitutionally enshrined.
While section 15 of the Charter bars sexual discrimination the extent
of that provision into the private sphere is hotly debated, as was discussed
above. Nonetheless, the Commissioner in Ontario has received some
legislative guidance in the Ontario Human Rights Code that sexual
discrimination is unacceptable.
The Superintendent should work directly with the industry to
eliminate the discriminatory tables. Up to this time, that office has taken
a passive stance on the issue. While the chief actuary said he would
like to see gender-neutral factors take a larger role in rate-setting, he
nonetheless respects the right of the industry to consider actuarially sound
distinctions and, until gender-neutral criteria are developed, believes
gender-based tables ought to be permitted.95 Consultation with the
Superintendent and development of criteria should begin as soon as
92 Kimball tries to distinguish this as a valid parallel in his 1979 article (supra, note 61),
but is largely forced in the face of Brilmayer's analysis, to concede that the parallel is fair in
his 1980 article (supra, note 85). He also argues in the 1979 article that because races are not
'pure', race is not a practically usable category. I find that argument unconvincing. Benston takes
the other approach: insurers ought to be permitted to use racially-based distinctions, if they are
actuarially sound. see Benston, supra, note 61 at 511.
93 (1984) 482 A.2d. 542 (Pa.).
94 Ibid. at 549.
95 Newton and Rahman, supra, note 61. Mr. Rahman gives more credence to a biologically
based theory.
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possible. As more and more women enter the work force, become eligible
for pensions, and have the disposable income to purchase annuities,
transitional problems will only grow for the industry.
There are no immediately promising routes to litigate the issue of
gender-based actuarial distinctions in pension plans in Ontario. Plans
using such tables are specifically permitted to do so under the Employment
Standards Act. The Ontario Human Rights Code further finds that the
right to equal treatment in employment is not infringed by plans
conforming with the Employment Standards Act,96 thus limiting the
availability of a remedy under the Code.97 Eliminating tables in the pension
field probably requires regulatory amendments.
The bulk of the debate in Ontario and elsewhere has centred on
the use of gender-based tables in pension plans, not in private insurance.
The case against gender-based tables is equally applicable to the private
insurance industry, however, so the possible success of an attack on private
insurance through the Ontario Human Rights Code must be seriously
considered. Gender-based tables give rise to a prima facie case of
discrimination under the Code, although the effect of section 21 of the
Code, which allows gender-based distinctions based on "reasonable and
bona fide grounds" in insurance, remains an open question.
Section 21 was recently considered by an Ontario Board of Inquiry,
in Bates v. Zurich Insurance Company of Canada.98 Although currently
under appeal, this decision provides some guidance as to the scope and
meaning of section 21. The board held that there were two parts to
96 See s. 24(2) of the Code, discussed supra.
97 There is a slight chance for an alternative route. A complainant might allege a violation
of ss 1 or 3 of the Code, regarding equal access to services and the right to contract on equal
terms respectively. That would have the effect of displacing s. 24(2), which applies only to
employment-related discrimination. Instead, the reasonable and bonafide test of s. 21 would apply.
Support for this position comes from the specific reference to 'group insurance' in s. 21. That
term is defined under s. 9(e) of the Code as "insurance whereby the lives or well-being or the
lives and well-being of a number of persons are insured severally under a single contract between
an insurer and an association or an employer or other person." Pension plans would appear to
fit this definition. The counter-argument is that pensions are essentially employment-related, and
any discrimination implied is essentially discrimination in a term or condition of employment, not
in services or contracts. That argument is intuitively appealing, as to hold otherwise would significantly
restrict the application of s. 24(2). On the other hand, s. 24(2) could arguably still have the effect
of protecting the employer from a human rights complaint about the policy, as the remedy under
s. 1 or 3 would presumably be against the underwriting insurance company. That might be an
important restriction in a labour law context, to protect the employer from a collateral attack
on a collective agreement through the Code. Whatever the merit of this argument, it would be
tactically better for persons wishing to challenge the use of the tables in pension plans to see
how the boards and courts deal with the insurance issue, where the jurisdictional wrangle does
not exist.
98 (1985), 6 C.H.R.R. D/2948 (Ont. Bd. of Inq.). Currently under appeal. This is apparently
the first case to consider the scope of the Ontario provisions: see 2961 of the decision, and also
J. Keene, Human Rights Law in Ontario (Toronto: Carswell, 1983).
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the test.99 Regarding bona fides, the test is subjective: the allegedly
discriminatory ground must be imposed "honestly, in good faith, and
in the sincerely held belief that the limitation is imposed in the interests
of adequate performance" of the task.loo A serious allegation of bad faith
against insurers in a case dealing with gender-based mortality tables
is unlikely, so this part of the test poses no problem to the industry.
The second "reasonableness" part of the test is objective. The first
test is the use of the criterion "reasonably necessary to assure the
objectives" of the industry;o0 the second is whether there are reasonable
grounds for believing that all or substantially all of the persons in the
class would not be adversely affected by the classification?102 To meet
the second part of the test, the insurer was required to show that "[i]n
narrow terms.., the very essence of its business would be undermined
if it could no longer rely on discriminatory group characteristics for its
rate classification system."03 Manhart was quoted with approval.,04
The board did not accept the statistical significance of the car
insurance gender-based risk groups as proof of reasonableness. Instead,
the board required that it be "scientifically proven that there is a direct
causal relationship between the discriminatory group factors used - age,
sex and marital status and high risk."10s If a board were to make the
same causally based requirement of the life insurance industry regarding
gender-based mortality tables, a stronger case could be made out than
was put forth in Bates. At the very least, it would be difficult to convince
the board on a balance of probabilities that sexual differences are entirely,
or perhaps even predominantly, biologically based.
Finally, the board held that the insurer must show that it would
be impossible to use any other set of criteria to determine premiums.,os
In the life insurance and annuities field, the unisex tables provide one
possible option. The difference in premiums between men and women
is about 15 percent. The use of unisex tables for annuities would therefore
99 The Board relied primarily on Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Borough of Etobicoke
(1982), 132 D.L.RL (3d) 14, and to a lesser degree on Caldwell v. Stuart (1985), 15 D.L.R- (4th)
1.
100 Bates, supra, note 97 at D/2961.
101 Ibid. at D/2962.
102 Ibid. at D/2963.
103 Ibid. at D/2965.
04 Ibid at D/2963.
105 Ibid. at D/2965.
106 Ibid. at D/2965.
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result in premiums changing by roughly half that, 7.5 percent.,07 It might
be difficult to argue that this was not a viable option.
The ability of the private insurance industry to function would not
be severely undermined by a move to gender-neutral tables. Annuities
and pensions are an essential part of planning for retirement and life
insurance is important risk protection for survivors. The need for these
services is great to individuals. The movement to unisex tables will not
significantly change the number of policyholders in the private
marketplace.
The Code also prohibits constructive discrimination, that is, any
"requirement, qualification, or consideration" which, while seemingly
neutral, would result in disparate impact upon an identified group
according to the prohibited grounds.o8 Such discrimination would ob-
viously occur in a move to a unisex table: men would be charged more
for annuities, and women more for life insurance. The issue then becomes
which discrimination is to take precedence. Prima facie discrimination
ought to be remedied before constructive discrimination. The purpose
of the Act was to combat discrimination against individuals. The con-
structive discrimination section was added in 198 1, presumably to extend
the same purposes of the Code. To use that extension to restrict the
original purpose of the Code or to effectively permit discrimination against
individuals would be counter-productive.o9
The nature of pension, annuity, and life insurance contracts makes
effecting a remedy difficult. Where in auto insurance, for example,
eliminating gender-based distinctions could be accomplished effectively
through re-negotiation of contracts on non-discriminatory terms when
they come up for renewal, individual contracts for pensions, life insurance,
and annuities may last for the lifetime of the individual. As a result,
107 This is at the very best a loose approximation, and would of course need to be adapted
to the actual class of people buying annuities and life insurance. At this time, purchasers of both
life insurance and annuities are predominantly male, although this is gradually changing: Rahman,
supra, note 61. As a result, assuming the present mixture of men and women, the life expectancy
of the entire class would be closer to the male life expectancy than the female. The result would
be that in annuities, premiums for men would rise by less than the 7.5 percent, and premiums
for women would fall by more than 7.5 percent. In life insurance, premiums for men would fall
by a relatively small amount.
108 Ontario Human Rights Code, supra, note 33 at s. 10.
109 Limited support for this position may be gleaned from the Code itself. Constructive
discrimination does not offend part I of the Code if "it is declared in this Act that to discriminate
because of such ground is not an infringement of a right": bid at s. 10(b). Section 13(1) holds
that a right is not infringed by the "implementation of a special programme ... that is likely
to contribute to the elimination of the infringement of rights under Part L" The combined effect
of these provisions is that constructive discrimination is to give way to direct discrimination, at
least in this limited range of cases. A finding of discrimination under the Code is not a "special
program" within the meaning of s. 13. Nonetheless, boards of inquiry ought to take their lead
from this principle.
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one must either change existing contractual rights, or make the non-
discriminatory criteria apply to new contracts, and leave in effect
discriminatory contracts which may have decades to run.
The Code restricts remedies to matters "in respect of the complaint
and in respect of future practices."io Apart from changing the contract
of the individual complainant, no other changes to existing contracts
seems to be within the scope of the Code. Relief under the Code could
not, therefore, be retroactive in any systematic sense.
Legislative redress is not so restricted. The proposed Non-
Discrimination in Insurance Act of 1983, for example, would have required
'topping up' of insurance plans, that is, increasing benefits to the higher
of the levels received by the two sexual classes. Men's life insurance
benefits would have been re-calculated based on the life expectancy of
women, and women's annuity benefits would have been re-calculated
on the life expectancy of men. This would have placed policyholders
in a better position than they would have been in under unisex tables,
entirely at the expense of the industry. This would have been inappro-
priately generous. There is a need for stability in the insurance industry,
and the topping up provisions would have been very difficult for the
industry to absorb."' Equalizing payments to future retirees at the level
of the unisex rates would be significantly less expensive.112 This approach,
however, has its drawbacks. Men have been making contributions to
money purchase plans and RRSPs on the expectation that these will
purchase a specific lifestyle on retirement. The move to unisex tables
will reduce the amount these individuals will receive. Pensioners making
retirement plans would find that they had less income on retirement
than they had anticipated. If they retire soon, they will not have a chance
to correct this by increasing contributions. The vast majority of pensions
presently vesting belong to men. As a result, the unisex table for persons
about to retire would be very close to the present male mortality table,
making the prejudice to these men relatively small. Therefore, a move
to unisex tables might be acceptable.
Decreased vesting periods as suggested above could significantly
increase women's share of the pension pie in a short time, however,
perhaps prejudicing men about to retire. A third option should be
considered. Under this option, benefits relating to contributions to RRSPs
110 Ibid at s. 40(1)(a).
III The cost of H.R. 100 to the pension industry alone would have been $1.7 billion (U.S.)
per annum in the short term, according the United States Department of Labour. Hearings at 63.
112 The United States Department of Labour estimated that the cost of using unisex tables
for future retirees only to be twenty per cent of the cost of the universal topping up provisions:
ibid at 64.
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and money-purchase plans made prior to the enactment of remedial
legislation could be calculated using gender-based tables, but benefits
resulting from subsequent contributions would be based on gender-neutral
tables. Under such a scheme, men would be given the option of increasing
their contributions to the plan to maintain their benefit level, or accepting
a lower benefit level with the same premiums. This approach would
also minimize disruption within the insurance industry. The difficulty
with this approach is that full equality would not be attained for decades.
Still, it is a workable long-term solution to the inequality problem.
C. Actuarial Tables in Context
In all the talk of theoretical justifications and technical law, the
larger context tends to get lost in the shuffle. This has been unavoidable
in this discussion, as happens in most of the secondary literature dealing
with the mortality tables. This paper began by discussing the poverty
of elderly women. While the issue of gender-based mortality tables is
theoretically interesting and important for human rights law, the amend-
ments and remedies discussed above will not affect persons now retired.
In fact the benefits of abolishing gender-based distinctions may take
decades to phase in.
The argument may in fact extend a step further. If alternative criteria
are developed, the bulk of the gain made by women in the prohibition
of gender-based tables may disappear. As an example, assume once again
that the entire difference between women and men in life expectancy
is the result of heavier smoking and drinking among men. A move to
tables based on smoking and drinking would eliminate the unfairness.,3
On the other hand, as women would tend to be the non-smokers and
non-drinkers, their premiums and benefits would be very much as they
are now. While the legal and theoretical problems will be solved, no
significant effect will be made on the practical problem of ensuring
adequate pensions for women.
More importantly, the issue of gender-based actuarial tables must
be placed in their context in the pension system. In 1981, there were
approximately 2.3 million senior citizens in Canada.11 Well over half
were women, yet only 327,095 of these women reported any pension
113 In the areas of pensions and annuities, on this specific point, it is conceivable that the
tables might be void as against public policy. The argument would be that excessive smoking
and drinking are to be discouraged, and that the effect of using them in the calculation of rates
for pensions and annuities is to benefit smokers and drinkers, thus encouraging these vices. I have
reservations as to whether such an argument would be successful. In addition, note that other possible
classification systems such as occupation-based systems do not have this problem.
114 Statistics Canada, Pensions, supra, note 7 at 89.
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income on their tax returns. Women have not traditionally acquired
pension rights of their own. The desegregation of mortality tables will
assist those who do receive pensions, either as a result of their own
employment or as survivors, but by only approximately 15 percent. A
significant change in the pattern of poverty will occur if more women
acquire pensions. The vesting changes discussed above should thus be
accorded a higher priority than the elimination of gender-based mortality
tables.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The notions of equality for women that have developed in the last
twenty years place a strain on the insurance industry. The industry is
being called upon to change some of its ground rules. Understandable
concern has been shown about the effects of these proposed changes
on the solidity of the industry. On the other hand, women are not receiving
equitable treatment. Few receive pensions, and those who do receive
smaller pensions than their male counterparts. Actuarial tables work to
the disadvantage of women in the purchase of annuities in the private
insurance market.
Admittedly, some of the problems faced by women can only be
remedied through improved social programmes, particularly in the short
term. However, that is not an argument for the private insurance and
pension industry to ignore inequities in that industry, and it is not an
argument against long-term solutions. On the contrary, insurers should
work to introduce equitable treatment while minimizing the adverse effects
on the solidity of the insurance industry.
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